Yemen: Restoring State Control in Sanaa Key to Lasting Peace

The ongoing conflict in Yemen, stemming from the Houthi militia's coup, renders any talk of peace a political illusion as long as the capital, Sanaa, remains outside state control. Past experiences have demonstrated that peace cannot be imposed through superficial agreements or temporary truces; it fundamentally begins with ending the Houthi coup and reclaiming the state institutions seized by force.

Contrary to attempts to promote alternative political pathways, the reality is that the Houthi group has treated every peace initiative solely as a tool to buy time, regroup its forces, and strengthen its military and economic grip. This approach has been accompanied by continued repression, resource plunder, and the erosion of remaining state authority. Consequently, liberating Sanaa is presented as a sovereign prerequisite that cannot be bypassed, an indispensable step toward halting the war and paving the way for genuine and lasting peace.

Observers note that the Houthis have not engaged with any peace initiative as a means to end the war, but rather as an opportunity to consolidate the de facto situation, undermine state institutions, loot public resources, impose levies, and perpetrate widespread violations against public freedoms and citizens' rights.

Political analysts assert that Sanaa remaining under Houthi militia control effectively means the center of sovereign decision-making stays outside the state's framework. This hollows out any discussion of peace and prevents the establishment of national institutions capable of governing the country or addressing the escalating economic and humanitarian crises.

Writers and specialists in Yemeni affairs concur that liberating Sanaa and restoring state institutions represent the natural gateway to any sustainable peace process. This would bring an end to the war and open the door for comprehensive national reconciliation, founded on the principle of partnership and justice, rather than the logic of dominance and weaponry.

They point to the experiences of other nations, which have shown that peace cannot be achieved while armed groups impose their vision by force and refuse to submit to state authority and law. They consider ending the coup a prerequisite for ending the conflict, not a subsequent outcome.

In this context, Yemeni politicians are calling on the international community, particularly the United Nations, to re-evaluate its approaches to the Yemeni crisis and shift from managing the conflict to supporting a clear path for restoring the state, as it is the sole guarantor of regional stability, international navigation, and neighborhood security.

They warn that continued reliance on partial settlements or agreements that do not address the core of the coup will lead to new rounds of violence, exacerbate the suffering of Yemenis, and provide the group with more time to deepen its control.

Amidst a blocked political horizon and worsening living conditions, the option of restoring state control and liberating Sanaa emerges as the most realistic path to ending the war and building a just and lasting peace. This would return the abducted state to its people, open the door for reconstruction, restore stability, and resolve one of the region's longest and most complex crises.

Observers conclude that peace in Yemen will not be achieved through ambiguous settlements, but through a clear resolution that reinstates the state and its institutions, ends the coup, and grants Yemen a genuine opportunity to transition to a secure and stable future.